Over the past decade, the WTO dispute settlement system has continued to be used extensively, contrasting with the very few disputes taken to inter-state adjudication under FTAs. This paper discusses the causes of this discrepancy, arguing that, besides specific procedural difficulties, it may be explained by a more structural difference between adjudication in a multilateral and in a bilateral setting. The WTO's global scope and the collective surveillance established by the DSU ensure that findings of breach harm a wrongdoer's reputation and mobilize community pressure for compliance.
Introduction
Ever since the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 1995, its dispute settlement system has been considered its crown jewel. Members This paper discusses the contrast between the vigor of the WTO dispute settlement system and the virtual paralysis of dispute settlement under FTAs, arguing that it is due not only to procedural legal reasons (which make FTA adjudication less predictable) but also to the multilateral character of WTO adjudication. In addition to making WTO adjudication more attractive than FTA adjudication when both are available, this multilateral aspect may be instrumental in making adjudication more attractive than unilateral retaliation as a means of exerting pressure on a wrongdoer to comply with the underlying agreement.
The argument proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines WTO disputes between Members that are parties to FTAs over the period [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] [2016] , discussing the reasons for these disputes to have been brought before the WTO rather than under the FTA. Section 3 argues that, besides procedural legal reasons specific to each FTA, a broader reason explains the lack of FTA disputes: the absence of the multilateral enforcement pressure that is integral to WTO adjudication. As a result, FTA parties may be tempted to retaliate unilaterally rather than take their disputes to adjudication. Section 4 examines the practice of WTO dispute settlement with respect to retaliation, showing that retaliation is used as a threat but, when authorized, is rarely applied. The real strength of WTO dispute settlement is not in the authorization for retaliation but in the adjudication process that precedes it. Section 5 concludes. 
WTO disputes between

India -Japan FTA India -Iron and Steel Products (DS518)
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Indonesia -Iron or Steel Products (Viet Nam) (DS496)
Thailand -Cigarettes (Philippines) (DS371)
ASEAN -Australia -New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA)
Indonesia -Import Licensing Regimes (New Zealand)
(DS477)*
Australia -Tobacco Plain Packaging (Indonesia)
(DS467)
Australia -New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA)
Australia -Apples (DS367) * A request for consultations was submitted on substantially the same matter (DS466) and never led to the establishment of a panel.
Examining these disputes, two types of reasons appear to prevail in the decision to resort to WTO adjudication rather than FTA adjudication. First, the lack of a clear and predictable procedure leading to a decision within a reasonable time makes most FTA dispute settlement mechanisms less reliable than WTO dispute settlement. Second, , even where a decision can in principle be obtained within a similar time, the reduced ability of FTA dispute settlement to produce the impact a WTO condemnatory report produces may make recourse to FTA dispute settlement appear less useful than recourse to the WTO.
A. Procedural legal reasons: lack or weakness of third-party dispute settlement
A key reason why many disputes are brought before the WTO rather than an FTA is the predictability of the WTO dispute settlement procedure, and the certainty of obtaining a This highlights another advantage of WTO adjudication over FTA adjudication:
institutional channels for Members not parties to the dispute to participate in the proceedings, as well as a political forum -the Dispute Settlement Body -in which they may express their views even without having participated. To participate in the proceedings, WTO Members may file parallel claims and participate as co-complainants.
They may join the dispute as third parties, avoiding the confrontational aspect that is involved in filing a claim while still signaling their interest in the matter and providing their views on the subject-matter of the dispute. And, even if they refrain from participating in the proceedings, they are still entitled to press for compliance at DSB meetings.
Collective adoption of reports by the DSB entitles every Member to demand compliance.
Adoption is often seen as a procedural quirk, given that it is virtually automatic. In sum, the 'collective' element of WTO adjudication is a powerful reason why Members would prefer WTO adjudication over FTA adjudication. These procedural elements provide Members with an opportunity to demonstrate interest in the dispute and press for compliance even when they have not been complainants. Other Members can dress their economic interest in seeing a specific policy change as a systemic interest in compliance. This is relevant because the value of adjudication as a remedy is significantly tied to its capacity to mobilize collective pressure against a violator.
Adjudication as a remedy in trade agreements: the value of multilateralism
A. Remedies and compliance: reputation, reciprocity, retaliation
Many analyses of remedies in trade agreements start from the procedural arrangements put in place by the dispute settlement rules of the DSU and (most) FTAs. Under these arrangements, retaliation appears as the last resort, as if the whole procedure were oriented towards obtaining an authorization to retaliate. A party that considers that a violation has taken place must first raise the matter bilaterally with the alleged wrongdoer. If bilateral negotiations are unsuccessful, it must then resort to adjudication. Only after an adjudicatory decision has been issued and in case of non-compliance with its terms may the aggrieved party lawfully retaliate against the wrongdoer.
Some assessments of dispute settlement infer from these legal arrangements that adjudication is largely an obstacle to the 'real' remedy of authorized trade retaliation, which would be capable of providing aggrieved parties with some form of compensation for the breach. 41 The various steps of WTO adjudication, including consultations, appeal, a period of time for implementation, and a procedure to assess compliance, thus appear as a burdensome requirement obstructing the ultimate goal of responding to a violation with trade retaliation. The adjudication process has thus been labelled 'a cost-free opportunity to delay compliance for several months' 42 or 'a de facto escape clause for the duration of the legal proceedings'. 43 However, the fact that the authorization for retaliation occupies the position of remedy of last resort in the legal process does not mean that it is the reason states resort to adjudication, or a means for the aggrieved party to make itself 'better off'. As discussed in Section 4 below, retaliation is rarely used when authorized. When used, it appears overwhelmingly as an instrument available to aggrieved parties to induce compliance, and not as a means to extract reparation from the wrongdoing Member. Despite analyses suggesting that retaliation could in some cases improve the terms of trade of the retaliating party, 44 the practice of WTO Members is to use it as a means of inducing compliance. Without adjudication, states may comply with their obligations for several 'internal' reasons.
Incorporation of international rules into domestic legislation may achieve compliance by ensuring that civil servants and domestic judges apply international norms; compliance may 
B. Remedies and the prohibition of unilateral retaliation
The WTO Agreements and most FTAs establish a lex specialis to the general rules on implementation of responsibility, prohibiting unilateral retaliation and requiring parties that feel aggrieved by an alleged violation to resort to adjudication instead of retaliating.
Retaliation is considered as a last resort in case the violation persists after adjudication. In what compliance requires. A third possible reason is that a condemnation by an impartial international adjudicator affects the internal political process within the defendant, giving its government a reason to withdraw a measure that was of little or no interest to the government or the state in general but was politically difficult to withdraw because it benefited a specific organized or powerful constituency. Blaming the withdrawal on an international body, and on the threats of lower reputation, reciprocity and retaliation by other states, makes the change of conduct politically more palatable.
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C. The choice between adjudication and retaliation
Despite its potential effectiveness, retaliation is a risky move for the retaliating state. As any form of sanction, trade retaliation involves a cost for the party employing it. 54 It affects domestic industries and consumers that rely on the targeted products. In order to be useful, retaliation requires both that the damage to the target be significant and that the cost for the retaliating party be not too high. For this reason, usually only 'large' states are able to employ it successfully. Even for these large states, however, applying retaliation has costs. It disrupts trade between the retaliating party and the violator, and is often described as the retaliating party 'shooting itself in the foot' to harm the wrongdoer. If the alleged violator perceives the retaliation itself as a breach, it may be tempted to counter-retaliate. While international law establishes parameters to avoid escalation of specific disputes into broader conflicts, the possibility of unilateral retaliation leading to such escalation always looms.
55
Adjudication presents a useful alternative to retaliation if it can perform the same function of conveying a seriousness of purpose and drawing attention to the violation without requiring a state to shoot itself in the foot. 
D. Adjudication and retaliation in the WTO and FTAs
Some assessments of the choice of enforcement method are limited to the question of the choice of forum: whether a WTO Member faced with a measure that violates WTO law as well as an FTA (a common occurrence for trade-restrictive measures) will resort to dispute settlement under the DSU or under the FTA. Examining this question, Marc Busch concluded that states will choose a forum depending on whether they wish to establish a precedent at the multilateral level, as well as on their political inclination ('illiberal' states should choose FTAs over WTO).
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However, the potential choices of a state harmed by a violation include not only a choice of forum but also the choice whether to litigate at all. Rather than undergoing resourceconsuming adjudication procedures that will probably take two years to complete and will, in most cases, provide it with a mere confirmation that its claims are justified, a complainant might be tempted to retaliate unilaterally and immediately. In fact, international relations scholars argue that compliance with international agreements is maintained in large A structural difference between WTO adjudication and FTA adjudication that might help explain the success of the former is the multilateral character of WTO adjudication. This involves, on the one hand, greater attention given to a WTO dispute settlement report than what would be received by a ruling from a bilateral panel. Internally, a report that receives the imprint of the World Trade Organization can be expected to receive far more media attention than a report or award issued under a bilateral trade agreement the public and the media itself are unfamiliar with. Equally importantly, externally, the fact that the report is subsequently adopted by the entire WTO Membership at the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) makes it a collective decision of the Membership, and continued violation an issue of concern to all Members.
E. Retaliation, reputation and the 'missing' FTA disputes
The result of the WTO's unique breed of institutional adjudication and collective surveillance is that a Member found in breach of its WTO obligations is constantly subject to peer pressure, which reaches particularly acute levels when new decisions are issued (i.e. when a panel and the Appellate Body decide on non-compliance and when the arbitrators issues a decision on retaliation). This positive effect on WTO compliance of collective peer pressure has often been noted. Robert Hudec has found that this 'community pressure' was the key to the success of GATT litigation, 61 and Giovanni Maggi has hinted at the existence of 'multilateral enforcement pressures' 62 which would explain compliance by large Members that could brush off threats of retaliation from smaller ones. Joost Pauwelyn has also noted that persistent violation generates 'community costs' for the wrongdoer.
Contrasting with the multilateral WTO dispute settlement system, in adjudication under FTA the adjudicators are usually separated from the political decision-making bodies. 64 While an organ may be specifically required to consider cases of non-implementation, such an organ would seem superfluous in bilateral FTAs for purposes of generating additional community pressure, since the two parties would be aware of existing issues (meetings may of course allow communication and serve as a forum for bilateral pressure and negotiations). Even in 'minilateral' FTAs composed of a handful of parties, trade disputes may be seen as matters of concern to the parties to the dispute only, with other parties choosing to stay out of the matter. Thus, while the product of adjudication may appear similar in a bilateral and in a multilateral setting, its ability to affect the reputation of the offender may be very different depending on the forum chosen.
On the other hand, the threat of retaliation operates similarly in a bilateral and in a multilateral setting. Its ability to induce compliance depends essentially on the size of the retaliating party's market, and on the relation between the costs that the retaliating party imposes on the offender (by shutting some of the offender's exports out of its market) and the cost the retaliating party suffers from the retaliation (by denying its companies and consumers access to the violator's products). Importantly, these costs are produced whether or not retaliation is preceded by adjudication, and whether or not it takes place lawfully. In fact, the time required for adjudication hampers the utility of retaliation as a deterrent of breach. If FTA adjudication cannot create reputational costs comparable to those created under the WTO system, an aggrieved party may be tempted not only to choose WTO adjudication over FTA adjudication, but also to choose unilateral retaliation over FTA adjudication.
There is significant evidence that unilateral retaliation remains relevant even within the WTO setting, and that bilateral understandings over norm-compliance take place within broader negotiations concerning reciprocal mutual trade relations. 65 It is not uncommon for mutually agreed solutions to disputes to include provisions that bear little relation with the object of the dispute the mutually agreed solution refers to. 66 The lack of use of FTA dispute settlement, coupled with a reduction in WTO dispute settlement between Members that sign FTAs, indicates that FTAs may in fact increase the extent to which Members respond to breaches with unilateral retaliation rather than resort to adjudication.
Among FTAs which have not seen any recent use, the case of Mercosur is particularly interesting because its dispute settlement system can be resorted to unilaterally by any suggests that, within the framework of the dispute settlement system, retaliation operates precisely as the 'last resort' that the DSU states it should be. Of the first 386 disputes initiated, 28% were settled or discontinued without the establishment of a panel; 58% were settled or discontinued before the adoption of a DSB report. Of the 162 reports adopted, only 26 (16%) were followed by a dispute on compliance compliance followed adjudication or reached an alternative arrangement with the violator.
Only in thirteen disputes (8%) did the procedure reach the stage at which arbitration on retaliation was necessary. If adjudication did not produce any effects, many if not most defendants could be expected to drag their feet and wait for the threat of retaliation to materialize before taking any measures to address the complainant's grievances. Instead, in 92% of the disputes up to DS386 defendants either complied or settled the dispute before reaching the stage at which authorized retaliation became a concrete possibility.
Where disputes have reached the retaliation stage, this usually took place after a long procedure involving one original report, one compliance report and one arbitration on the level of permissible retaliation. Table 3 summarizes the time it took for each dispute to reach the stage of authorized retaliation. 
Conclusion
Both the WTO Agreements and FTAs are known for having 'teeth'. 89 The teeth include, on the one hand, adjudication procedures that alleged wrongdoers may not block; on the other hand, a potential authorization for aggrieved parties to retaliate in case of failure to comply with the adjudicator's decision. These two means of enforcement operate by mobilizing distinct forces for compliance. Adjudication publicizes and highlights the violation, harming the offender's reputation as a reliable trade partner. Trade retaliation (and threats thereof) denies the violator's producers access to the retaliating party's market.
Retaliation is an integral part of inter-state negotiations. Trade agreements provide states wishing to escalate a dispute with an alternative to retaliation: adjudication. However, the potential choices of a state harmed by a violation include not only a choice of forum -i.e.
whether a to litigate before the WTO or an FTA -but also a choice whether to litigate at all.
This choice takes into account, on the one hand, the expected value of adjudication, and possibly of the authorization to retaliate, and on the other hand the possibility of direct negotiations, including threats of (overt or covert) retaliation.
Retaliation is sometimes seen as the main remedy in trade disputes. An assessment of FTA and WTO practice, however, demonstrates that FTA litigation, which should in principle produce a quicker authorization to retaliate with less judicial oversight, is almost not resorted to. At the same time, at the WTO Members favor the allegedly weaker remedyadjudication -over the allegedly stronger one of retaliation. The latter is treated in practice as the last resort that the drafters of the DSU considered it should be.
The discrepancy between the vibrant practice of WTO adjudication and the virtual absence of FTA adjudication (in 2007-2016) may be explained in part by the collective character that the DSU imprints on WTO disputes, which leads to community pressure and not only pressure from the complainant. If adjudication generates enough community pressure, retaliation becomes relatively less attractive as a means to induce compliance; it is mostly attractive as a means of escalating the dispute, once the alternative of adjudication has been exhausted. In the absence or ineffectiveness of community pressure -a common situation in FTAs -adjudication is a less powerful remedy, and retaliation becomes a more attractive 
